


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Naval Forces Vietnam
Monthly Historical Summary
Jan 1966

SUMMARY REPORT, JANUARY 1966

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The purpose of this report is to give a general "feeling" for what the U.S. Navy accomplished in Vietnam during January 1966.

The daily occurrences which so well demonstrate the perseverance and determination of our men are treated summarily. Only an occasional event is described in detail to give an idea of what effort and courage are involved in what we now consider "the daily routine".

The major events of the month are given fuller treatment. These are the events which consumed a major portion of our attention and effort at the time they were happening.

to include contents

from 12/28/65
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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF EVENTS

1. 311943H. Detected radar contact tracking on course 300, speed 9 knots. HISSEM on course 090, speed 12 knots. Contact was not showing navigational lights.
2. 312120H. HISSEM challenged contact by flashing light. Contact failed to respond. Contact changed course to west and increased speed to 11 knots. HISSEM continued to close.
3. 312217H. Contact was illuminated by aircraft. The contact changed course to 000 speed 11 knots.
4. 312259H. HISSEM closed contact to 500 yards and illuminated contact with floodlight. Contact ignored all requests to stop. HISSEM commenced to shadow trawler.
5. 010013H. Trawler turned on navigational/running lights while crossing (starboard to port) the bow of PROMINENT, a Norwegian freighter. Lights remained on duration of night.
6. 010137H. Trawler entered area nine on course 315, speed 10 knots. Position 08 degrees 33'N, 104 degrees 34-5'E.
7. 010147H. Trawler changed course to 220 speed 10 knots. Position 08 degrees 34.8'N, 104 degrees 34'E. Headed out of Market Time area.
8. 010333H. Trawler departed Market Time area at 08 degrees 21'N, 104 degrees 22.2'E on course 220 degrees speed 10 knots.
9. 011038H. HISSEM established communication contact with surveillance aircraft.
10. 011230H. Assumed surveillance of trawler from aircraft. Trawler on course 110 speed 8 knots. HISSEM proceeded to close to obtain photographs and to check identification markings.
11. 011415H. HISSEM closes to within 400 yards. Obtained photographs. Visual identification coincided with that of the previous night. Four personnel sighted. No suspicious activity observed.
12. 011432H. Opened range to 10 miles to maintain surveillance.
13. Surface search radar inoperative. Utilized height finding radar as surface search.
14. 020130H. Closed to 7 miles to ascertain whether or not the trawler was showing lights. It was.
15. 020400 - 022000H. Weather adversely effected radar. Trawler tracked to northeast averaging 10 knots.
16. 022000 - 032000H. No suspicious activity. Contact continued northeast movement through MERSHIP lanes averaging 8.3 knots.

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The first days of January presaged an active month. The first major happening had actually begun the evening of 31 December when USS HISSEM detected a radar contact at 07-15N, 105-07E. The contact was proceeding on a westerly course at nine knots. HISSEM closed the contact and at 312120H attempted to challenge by flashing light, but received no reply. At 2217H, the contact was illuminated by a SP-2 aircraft, but heavy swells prevented positive identification. HISSEM then closed to within five hundred yards and identified the contact as a Chinese Nationalist trawler, 100 feet in length, with a light blue steel hull and white superstructure. It was flying no colors and showing no lights, but the Chinese Nationalist flag was painted on both sides of the pilot house. When requested to stop, the contact did not comply. These factors, and because its course was bringing it directly toward South Vietnam, made the contact most suspicious. Heavy seas prohibited boarding, so HISSEM continued shadowing.


At 0910 on 1 January 1966, the contact was sighted and photographed by P-2 aircraft. During the interim, HISSEM had obtained the following identification. The trawler had a high stern and its stack was aft. On both sides of the bow and on the stern were slots apparently designed to hold a nameplate. The trawler had one long wire antenna and one D/F loop. Four persons were sighted on deck, and fishing nets were rigged to booms fore and aft. HISSEM continued to shadow in a generally northerly direction, maintaining surveillance outside of visual range. COMSEVENTHFLT was requested to provide a

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"Chinese Nationalist" trawler shadowed by USS HISSEN and USS INGRAHAM
31 December 1965 through 5 January 1966 in waters off Vietnam.



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unit to relieve HISSEM, thus giving the impression that surveillance was being discontinued in hope that the contact would return to the South Vietnamese coast or commit itself to a rendezvous. An additional consideration was that the contact's position was well outside the Market Time area. Although the trawler passed several large merchant ships, no rendezvous was attempted and no suspicious activity was noted. At 1250 on 4 January, HISSEM was relieved in the vicinity of 11-10N, 112-20.5E by the USS INGRAHAM (DD 694) who continued covert surveillance. The trawler continued to the north, penetrating the CHICOM contiguous zone at 21-16N, 112-20.5E at 1115H on 7 January. INGRAHAM continued to observe the contact close the communist mainland until 1500H when she departed for DIXIE station.

The realization that a Chinese Communist vessel had entered Market Time water, disguised as a Chinese Nationalist, prompted an informal study to determine what legal actions Market Time units could take if the perpetration were attempted again. It was determined that under the contiguous zone agreement with Vietnam, United States vessels do have the authority to stop, board, and search any vessel suspected of violating Vietnamese laws when within the twelve mile zone. However, the international implications of stopping a vessel flying a Communist Bloc flag outside of the three mile limit would require decisions at a higher level.

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Throughout the month there were numerous, almost daily, occurrences of Coastal Group junks with U.S. Navy advisors on board intercepting suspicious junks in the waters along the coast. On some occasions these suspicious junks proved innocent when inspected. At other times personnel were detained because they lacked proper credentials. Some of these people were later identified as Viet Cong, others were released with the admonition that they must carry their I.D. cards with them in the future. Of more concern were incidents like the following.

Intelligence reports in late December indicated that the Viet Cong on Phu Quoc Island were about to attempt to smuggle supplies from the mainland. To counter any such attempt, the patrol patterns of our craft in that area were temporarily altered to prevent any stereotype patrol and to congregate the ships in the northern area of Phu Quoc, where the attempted infiltration was expected. At 1700H on 6 January Coastal Group 42 reported that four junks were seen departing Bai Bung. As any junk in this area is highly suspect, it seemed that the precautions taken by the patrolling units was about to reap its reward. USCGC's POINT BANKS and POINT MARONE, and PCF-4 were dispatched to intercept the contacts. The P-2 aircraft conducting the daily surveillance flight was directed to report to POINT MARONE upon arrival in the area in case assistance was needed by the surface units in locating the junks. VNN ordered Coastal Group 42 underway, and directed LSIL 331 to the area.

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The four junks returned to the beach as the units closed in upon them. POINT MARONE took station to the north of the beached junks, and POINT BANKS and PCF-4 patrolled about 500 yards off the beach. The junks from Coastal Group 42 arrived on the scene about 1800H. POINT MARONE was then directed to resume her normal patrol. POINT BANKS was ordered to patrol about four miles to the north of the beach and PCF-4 was to stand off the beach at 1,000 yards while Coastal Group 42 proceeded to the beach to investigate.

As they approached the beach, Coastal Group 42 received heavy fire. Both the junk units and PCF-4 immediately returned the fire. During a forty-five minute fire fight 350 rounds of both .30 and .50 caliber were expended. One of the beached junks was observed to be badly damaged, but the damage to the others and the personnel casualties of the V.C. were unknown. By 2000H, a low tide prevented further investigation by the junk division, and all units withdrew. POINT BANKS resumed normal patrolling: PCF-4, the junks from Coastal Group 42, and LSIL 331, which had arrived in the area as the fire fight was ending, remained in the area, patrolling 1,000 yards from the beach.

Incidents like this are apparently hindering intra-country transfer of arms and supplies. However, the inability to prosecute to a final conclusion makes the evaluation hypothetical, and when experienced often enough engenders a feeling of frustration.

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A more fruitful interception occurred on the evening of 8 January when three units from Coastal Group 33 were conducting a routine patrol about two miles off the coast. At 2245H, while on a southerly course off Go Cong Province an advisor on one of the units sighted the silhouette of two junks about 1,000 yards on the port beam. The coastal group units challenged the two junks, first by search light, and when this brought no response, by firing several shots across their bow. The two junks returned automatic weapon's fire, increased their speed, and maintained their course of approximately 020°T. The Coastal Group units came about and gave chase.

When the V.C. junks determined that they could not outrun the Coastal Group units, they came to a westerly course and beached. The sea was at high tide at this time. The men in the junks — there were an estimated fifteen in each — fled ashore and continued the fight from the beach.

While the chase was in progress, a call had been made for the assistance of other junks at Coastal Group 33, and for ISIL 327, who was in the immediate area. As the fighting continued at the beach, it was evident that more immediate assistance would be required, and at about 2300 an airstrike was requested. An AC-47 was diverted from another mission and arrived on the scene within fifteen minutes.

Firing from the beach ceased with the commencement of the airstrike. As it was felt that the V.C. had withdrawn, a few men from Coastal Group 33 attempted to swim to the nearest junk to survey the damage and inspect the cargo. Firing from the beach resumed,

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
The junks intercepted by Coastal Group 33 on the night of 8 January 1966.

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Some of the arms and munitions salvaged from the Viet Cong junks.



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but did not prevent the swimmers from making a brief survey and discovering that the junk was carrying arms. The Coastal Group units withdrew from the area of the beach, to permit LSIL 327 to fire into the area and to allow A1E Skyraiders to conduct a strike. Upon completion of the second airstrike, Coastal Group 33 closed the junks to evaluate the damage and recover the junk's cargoes. The following is a list of weapons and ammunition recovered by Coastal Group 33:

- 168 German WW II Mauser rifles, with Swastika emblems

- 11 boxes of 12.7 mm rounds

- 4 boxes of 7.9 mm rounds

- misc. number of 7.62 mm rounds

- 3 boxes of 9 mm pistol ammunition

- 11 handgrenades

- 5 57 mm recoilless rounds

At 1145 on 9 January the 7th Reconnaissance company of the 7th ARVN Division proceeded to the area to conduct an area search. These forces retrieved the following munitions from the junks and from a cache in the area west of the boats:

- 181 rounds 57 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, Chinese manufacture

- 116 M1A1 anti-tank mines, U.S. manufacture

- 135,000 rounds of 7.62 and 8 mm ammunition of Chinese and German manufacture

- 24 RKG anti-tank grenades of Russian manufacture

- 1 Russian automatic carbine

- Assorted documents of little intelligence value

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The number of attacks against VNN and USN installations decreased slightly in January. Those that did occur, were repulsed; often with the assistance of U.S. ships. One example where Market Time units were quick to respond occurred on 9 January when word was received from the U.S. advisor at Coastal Group 16 that a Viet Cong battalion north of the junk base planned to attack the base that evening. Vietnamese Headquarters alerted its units in the area, but the available ships were either too far from the base to be of service in time, or suffering from some material deficiency. Market Time units and gunfire support ships from Seventh Fleet were then alerted to stand by. At 2130H the Coastal Group began to receive fire from east of their position. The CSC at Danang requested USS DYNAMIC to proceed toward Coastal Group 16 and diverted the VP-28 surveillance flight to the area to provide illumination in the event that it was needed before surface units could arrive. The Vietnamese PGM 604 was south of China Beach, and CSC Danang requested that CTF 115 permit the 604 to assume surveillance duties at China Beach and thereby permit POINT ELLIS to proceed to the area of the Coastal Group. Before any changes were effected, word was received from the advisor at Coastal Group 16 that all firing had ceased, with no casualties sustained by CG 16. All units maintained patrol in the area until 2400H, but no further attack was forthcoming.

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Final evaluation of the incident was that the firing was a probing action to test the defenses and reaction of the junk base.

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The increased number of minings has been a matter of great concern. In December, an attempted mining against the Danish merchant ship KINA clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the Saigon shipping channel. The attempted mining prompted immediate steps; the Vietnamese began using "O" type gear on 11 December and initiated a daily mid-channel sweep to supplement their current effort. The U.S. Navy initiated action to procure additional MCM units in order to institute around-the-clock minesweeping. A request was made to hasten the evaluation of anti-swimmer nets under development in the U.S., and CINCPAC sent representatives to study conditions on the Long Tau River to determine the optimum number of MSBs to be activated from semi-reserve status. How prudent these steps were was evidenced on 7 January, when the leader of a three man cell of the Viet Cong Naval Engineer Battalion surrendered to forces at the Ly Nhon post in Rung Sat Special Zone. Subsequent interrogation provided the following information.

The defector, Truong VAN DON had joined the V.C. in April 1963. In December 1963 he deserted his unit and took a civilian job in a saw mill in An Lac village in Binh Chanh District. A normal civilian existence continued until July 1965 when a bus

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driver, whom he became acquainted with while an active V.C., introduced him to the local Vietnamese intelligence officer. The latter urged him to join the V.C. sapper branch as a counter agent. In August Truong did so, and on 17 August he was assigned to the newly activated V.C. Naval Engineer Battalion in Rung Sat.

This battalion had the mission of attacking military ships transiting the Long Tau River. It was his unit that planted the mine that was exploded in attempt to sink the Danish merchant freighter on 2 December. In order to plant the mines they measured the width and depth of the river and studied the flow of the current. After this data was obtained, the team made three floats from coconut tree trunks, attached them to stones, and planted them in the proposed position of the mines. Ships movements were studied to be sure the ship passed through the area where the floats were placed. This operation was repeated three or four times, at three or four day intervals. After ascertaining that the ship always moved through the place where the floats were planted, the team returned to their headquarters to obtain permission to lay the mines.

Late in November the defector connected the floats with electrical wire that led to the bank. This wire was cut on two occasions by mine sweepers. The battalion then decided to wire the mines, but to delay planting them until the mine sweepers passed. On 1 December this plan was executed and three mines were planted. Truong claims that he intentionally made loose connections to two of the mines. It was one of these mines

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that was exploded near the Danish merchant ship KINA on 2 December 1965.

The confirmation of the presence of an Engineering Battalion in the Rung Sat Special Zone, caused acceleration of those projects already in progress. Studies on these projects, on the adaptability of new detection devices, and on the establishment of harbor defense units continued throughout January.

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In order to obtain operational information about the new PCF's, and to determine their ability to undergo long deployments, a plan evolved in late December for two PCF's to transit from An Thoi to Danang. Called Operation ANDANG, the cruise was scheduled to begin about 12 January. The two SWIFTs were to transit the coast in daily trips of about 125 miles. The primary purposes of the operation were: to obtain the operational information that would enable full exploitation of the SWIFT potential when deployed along the coast of Vietnam, to formulate doctrine for future long range transits, to conduct numerous port visits, to collect hydrographic information, and to conduct Market Time operations at various areas during the transit.

The operation was to commence on 12 January, but was delayed until 14 January as the final preparations consumed more time than was originally envisioned. The transit

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terminated at Poulo Obi on 15 January because PCF 12 incurred a material failure to her main engine heat exchanger brackets.

The two PCF's returned to An Thoi on 16 January, and repairs were completed on PCF 12 the same day. However, on 17 January the plan was aborted as three other PCF's had failures in their heat exchanger brackets, and it was felt that deployment of the two PCF's for operation ANDANG might prove detrimental to the overall patrol effort in the Gulf of Thailand.

Although the entire transit was never completed, much useful information was obtained. Six foot waves were found to be the maximum that a PCF could effectively operate in. To fight the seas when they were any rougher caused early crew fatigue and questionable patrol effectiveness. Minor physical changes were recommended for the PCF's: notably installation of a fresh water filler pipe that could permit pouring fresh water from a five gallon can, slight rearrangement of the pilot house to permit stowage of the additional charts required for the prolonged deployment, and manufacture of simple refueling rigs.

Although the preferred method of refueling and replenishing is to moor alongside in a calm lee, during ANDANG the PCF's fueled from a DER which was lying to, drifting to leeward at $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ knots in a 18 knot wind with seas of about five feet. As it was realized that this method might not always be possible, prior to deployment the PCF's exercised at underway refueling. This method is considered feasible, but due to the limited foredeck space is the least desirable.

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The prolonged underway time presented the first opportunity to collect performance data on the PCF's. This information has been compiled into a General Information Booklet.

The port visit at Poulo Obi seemed to be a great morale boost to those personnel assigned there. When future deployments are planned, attention should be paid to the psychological aspect of port visits at the remote junk bases.

* * * * *

A Market Time ship, the USS DYNAMIC, joined with the Seventh Fleet's USS NICHOLAS to conduct SAR operations on 21 January. The incident began at 0230 when the Panamanian merchant ship BRIGHT STAR, with 28 persons on board, went aground in the vicinity of Cu Lao Re Island off Chu Lai. At 0606 USS NICHOLAS, operating approximately 30 miles to the south, received word of BRIGHT STAR's plight. Upon closing the position, NICHOLAS established voice communications with BRIGHT STAR at 0645 and assumed duties as On-Scene Commander. USS DYNAMIC was directed to the scene and sighted BRIGHT STAR at 0726. A coordinated attempt was made by both vessels for a motor whaleboat and rubber raft rescue, but this was unsuccessful due to the extremely rough seas in the area. At 0910 two Marine UH-1B helicopters reported on station and two additional UH-34's arrived five minutes later. By 1025 all personnel were safely aboard NICHOLAS. The survivors were transported to Danang and subsequently turned over to Vietnamese authorities at 1530.

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From 19 to 27 January, USS LOWE (DER 325), USCGC POINT COMFORT, and PCF-10 conducted combined operations off the west coast of the Cau Mau peninsula. The purpose of this operation was to gather hydrographic data and to evaluate the operation of a PCF with its crews based aboard a DER. The following is a summary of the operation.

PCF-10 deployed from An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island, having as its first objective the survey of Fausse Poulo Obi Island to find suitable anchorages in case of bad weather. When this was done, PCF-10 proceeded to join LOWE in area 9A. The PCF crew that made the transit went on board LOWE to rest. The second PCF crew, both officers-in-charge, and LOWE's executive officer departed for Song Ong Doc to call on the District Chief.

POINT COMFORT joined LOWE and PCF-10 about 1400 and LOWE's commanding officer issued patrol orders. POINT COMFORT was assigned a patrol area north of Song Ong Doc, PCF-10 to the south, and LOWE was to conduct varied patrol patterns seaward of both units. This remained the basic patrol pattern for the duration of the operation.

During the day all units performed hydrographic work. The WPB and the PCF surveyed the in-shore waters and the DER traced the three-fathom curve. Junks were inspected as opportunity permitted, but it was at night when boardings and searchings were eminent. Each morning LOWE and PCF-10

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rendezvoused. The SWIFT was refueled and a refreshed crew went on board. Turnover time averaged thirty minutes. POIN. COMFORT received fuel from LOWE twice during the deployment. On 22 January LOWE was directed from the area to investigate a suspicious contact. Her absence was only for six hours and caused no change in the basic operation. On 27 January LOWE again left the area to conduct underway refueling and replenishment with Seventh Fleet units. The last day of the operation was spent doing intensive junk investigations.

Although the optimum time of an individual PCF on station has not been determined, it appears that a boat can remain for 10 days, barring major casualties. Operating experience was insufficient to warrant positioning PCF spare parts on board the DER, but this is a possibility for future operations. An increased interest by all the crews, a more aggressive search effort, and improved morale resulted when the three units operated as a team. Whether this was stimulated solely by the novelty of the operation only time will tell.

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Throughout the month planning continued on CTF 116's OPCODE, and by the end of January the initial draft was submitted for review. Real estate procurement for both interim and permanent base facilities continued, and advance base function components were ordered. During the latter part of January two logistic conferences were held;

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one in Subic Bay, the other in Pearl Harbor. The purpose of these conferences were to resolve logistic requirements and to establish future goals and implement means of achieving them. It is anticipated that the first FBR's will arrive in-country about 10 March.

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Coast Guard Squadron One relocated its headquarters on board USS KRISHNA at An Thoi, to Saigon on 31 January. Throughout the month, cutters from Division 11 were deployed on a regular basis in area 8, marking the first time these craft have maintained a continuous patrol 120 to 210 nautical miles from their support base. To accomplish this, the DER in the patrol area serves as "mother ship" to provide fuel, ammunition and other limited support. Coast Guard cutters from Division 12 in Danang coordinated training and operations with the six newly arrived PCF's. Nine Coast Guard cutters arrived at Subic Bay late in January, forming Division 13. These units will soon deploy to the Republic of Vietnam and operate from Vung Tau.

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The activities of Navy chaplains and physicians do not fall under the cognizance of this command. However, their work makes a distinct contribution to the pacification effort, helps maintain a high morale, and in many cases molds a more friendly citizenry.

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Their work lends itself to tabulation. How many patients were treated? How many surgical operations were performed? How many religious services were conducted? To give evidence of the extent of their contribution, enclosures (1), (2), and (3) are submitted.

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During January the Military Sea Transportation Service headquartered in Saigon scheduled 298 port calls at twelve ports in Vietnam. Over 555 thousand measurement tons of cargo were moved through these ports. Approximately 45% of these goods moved through the port of Saigon. Precise scheduling and detailed planning to expedite loading and unloading has reduced the congestion problem for MSTs ships to an almost non-existent level.

January was the first month that an MSTs representative was stationed at each of the twelve ports in-country. These men contributed greatly to the planning and scheduling that reduced the congestion problem. In addition, they provided on-the-scene reports of the progress of construction work at each port.

Three MSTs LST's were utilized to move 2,000 Vietnamese troops from Phan Rang to Tuy Hoa, on 18 to 21 January. These troops took part in an amphibious force landing at Tuy Hoa.

Enclosure (4) is submitted to give a detailed account of the ships calling at various ports throughout the month, and of the cargo handled at each port.

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Accomplishments in the advisory effort are best determined from a perspective of several months, for progress in this area is achieved in small steps on a day-by-day basis. However, during January, U.S. Advisors reported a gradual improvement in the material condition of some Vietnamese ships. Additionally, a few Vietnamese commanding officers acknowledged that a training program and some form of preventive maintenance had to be instituted on board their ships. While acknowledgement of the need has not changed the current situation, it does admit of a heretofore ignored problem. Additional advisory effort will be necessary to effect the change.

American advisors at the Coastal Groups and Repair Facilities reported that many long-standing orders for tools and spare parts were finally filled. While this satisfied an immediate need, it is most doubtful if it indicates a substantial improvement within the supply system.

A problem encountered during January was that of patrol effectiveness of the Vietnamese Sea Force ships. Advisors reported that the patrolling units were not conducting as many searches as in previous months, but the precise cause for this decrease was not determined. The American rationalization that the holiday mood of the people during Tet caused the reduced patrol effort could not be expanded to explain the decrease noted throughout the month. Diligent advisory effort at all levels attempted to correct this problem, but at the end of January no success was apparent.

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In retrospect we can see that the "limelight" shifted from the advisory role during the month. Several advisors were recalled from the field to assume positions on the CTF 115/116 staff where their experience was applied to the Game Warden project. In no case was the recall considered detrimental to the overall advisory effort, but we would be less than honest if we did not admit that a replacement in the field must serve an apprenticeship before he can make definite contributions to the advisory program. The overall evaluation for the month would be that progress continued, but the rate of progress did not increase.

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ENCLOSURE 1

**Extracts from the monthly report of Chaplains'
activities submitted by the Force Chaplain
assigned to III Marine Amphibious Force.**

1 January 1966

REVIEW OF CHAPLAINS ACTIVITIES

CHAPLAIN PERSONNEL

As of 1 January, 49 Chaplains are on duty in III MAF/NCC, a gain of two over the beginning of the reporting period. Present orders indicate a net gain of five during the next quarter. This will bring the Wing, NSA, and all MCB Units to TO, and place the Division four over TO; leaving III MAF/NCC in excellent condition for full Chaplain coverage.

Current on-board strength provides denominational coverage as follows: 31 Protestant; 16 Roman Catholic; 1 Jewish; 1 Eastern Orthodox.

Distribution by Enclave shows: 33 at Danang; 16 at Chu Lai; and 2 at Phu Bai.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

During the reporting period the regular religious program was carried out; and the following emphasis are of special significance:

(a) Marine Corps Birthday Sunday was emphasized in all Commands and received a good response. Lay participation and parading of colors characterized most of these Services.

(b) Thanksgiving Day Services were unusually well attended.

(c) The absence of much of the secular celebration of Christmas gave added significance to the religious celebration. All Chaplains made intense efforts to provide maximum coverage, with the result that 304 Divine Services were conducted over the Christmas weekend. The presence of the Chief of Chaplains and Cardinal Spellman added to the spiritual observance of Christmas.

OPERATION CHRISTMAS

The Chaplains of III MAF/NCC administered the distribution of gifts and letters received from organizations and individuals in CONUS during the Christmas Season. This operation was concerned only with items addressed to III MAF, "Any Marine," "Fighting Marine," or other non-personal addresses.

A total of 325,000 pounds of gifts were distributed to all Units, consisting largely of foodstuffs and reading matter. An estimated 50,000 cards and letters were placed on specially prepared bulletin boards for the perusal of all hands.

This expression of National good will received a most enthusiastic response throughout the Force. Many individual letters expressing thanks were originated at all levels. A serious effort was made to acknowledge all gifts received, the Chaplains taking a responsible role in this correspondence.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

The Chaplains participation in the Civic Action Program is steadily accelerating. On 1 December a four-phase program designed to coordinate support of all Vietnamese institutions of human welfare such as orphanages, institutions for the aged, hospitals, etc. was begun. Phase I is the locating of these institutions; Phase II is the determination of their needs; Phase III is the mobilizing of financial support; and Phase IV the execution of the program on a sustained basis. The first three Phases will be completed by 31 January and the programs implemented.

Particular emphasis in this program will be placed upon rendering support to Buddhist institutions and establishing the closest possible rapport between Chaplains and Buddhist representatives.

ENCLOSURE 2

Extracts from the Senior Medical Officer's
report of activities at U.S. Naval Support
Activity, Danang

1. The following is a report of medical assistance provided to Vietnamese personnel in January 1966:

a. Twenty-seven children with cleft lips received surgery at Quang Tri Province Hospital.

b. A Navy doctor made rounds at Danang civilian hospital on three occasions during the month. One hundred-twenty patients received assistance. On two occasions the doctor assisted with orthopedic surgical procedures.

c. The Navy neurosurgeon at the Danang civilian hospital performed five craniotomy procedures, one for subdural hematoma, and one secondary scalp closure.

d. One orphan, age 18 months, was admitted to the hospital and treated for two days. The village chief at Na Nuoc was admitted for one surgical procedure and was followed as an outpatient for one week. The daughter of this village chief was also treated at this hospital, the treatment consisting of an orthopedic surgical procedure.

e. Sick Call is made at the Sacred Heart Orphanage, Danang, East three times weekly on approximately 65 infants.

2. Civilian assistance other than medical: Two female Vietnamese are employed at the hospital laundry where they are learning the processing of linen through a flatwork ironer. Twelve male Vietnamese are employed as laborers on the hospital side. One male Vietnamese is employed by the Hospital Officer's Club where he is receiving instructions in the general duties of a bartender.

3. A Naval Medical Officer has devoted three hours weekly since 1 October to teaching English to Vietnamese students under the auspices of the Vietnamese-American Association.

ENCLOSURE 3

**Two reports from the Senior Medical Officer of
Advisory Team 54 at Rach Gia**

In addition to January's report, one for November is included. As no self-respecting Vietnamese will come near a hospital during the season of Tet. November's report is more representative of the normal workload.

Both reports are from a medical team which has recently returned to the United States. They came to Vietnam with their informal mission stated as "Teach yourselves out of a job". During their time in Vietnam six Vietnamese nurses have been trained as operating room technicians, two have been trained to give anesthesia; three others have become qualified as X-ray technicians and two as laboratory technicians.

TO: CHIEF, HOSPITAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION
USOM/SAIGON

MONTHLY TECHNICAL REPORT

Station: RACH GIA Surgical Team, KIEN GIANG Province

Report Period: Month of 1 - 31 November, 1965

Reporting Officer: JAMES L. FREEBY, L.C. DR., MC. USN

Date Submitted: 12 Feb ~~1966~~ Nov 1965

Team Composition:

Physicians	<u>3</u>
Nurses	<u>2</u>
Technicians	<u>1</u>
Others	<u>2</u>

Submit:

Original and one (1) copy to above office
One (1) copy to Regional PHD Representative

I. Statistical Summary:

A. Patient Care

1. No. of Inpatients treated: 643
2. No. of Outpatient consultations: 420 plus 564 E.R.
3. Operative Procedures Performed:

	War cas.	Other
Major	322	139
Minor	112	220

Emergency: 556

Elective: 97

4. Post-Operative Deaths:

Primary Diagnosis	Operation	Complication	Post-op. Day
Multiple Comp. FXS.	None	Crush Synd.	2 Hours
Brain concussion.	Debridement		2 Hours
Burn 20% 3rd°	Debridement	Renal Failure	8 Hours
Crush Injury	Amputation	?	2 Hours
Brain Concussion	Resuscitation		1 Hour

5. Anesthesia administered:

General: 119
Local: 243

B. Laboratory Services:

Urinalyses 74
Hematology 284
Blood Chemistry 1
Bacteriology 6
Parasitology 1
Other

C. Blood Bank:

Units drawn 102
Units dispensed 91
Units discarded 2

D. X-Ray Services

Number taken 390

II. Special Disease or Injury Problems (unusual cases, epidemics, infections, etc.):

1. Common dust obstruction due to ancaris.
2. Ruptured Caecum from illece, Trauma.

III. Comments (items of interest, additional activities, US/VN problems, future plans, etc.):

75% Completion of Hospital reconstruction.

(Continue on reverse side if needed)

IV. Personnel Action Needed:

1/ 1 Additional Administrative Assistant-Interpreter

2/ Pay raise for Miss GUB has not come through.

Station FACH CIA Month of Report NOV.

V. Logistics Action Needed:

Additional stove needed for distillation during construction.

2 Additional washers and dryers needed to handle anticipated load in laundry.

Station FACH CIA Month of Report NOV.

TO: CHIEF, HOSPITAL OPERATIONS BRANCH
PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION
USON/SAIGON

MONTHLY TECHNICAL REPORT

Station: WASH GLE

Report Period: Month of JANUARY, 1966

Reporting Officer: IC-DR. JAMES L. BERRY, MC USA

Team Composition:

Physicians 4

Nurses 4

Technicians 4

Others 4

Submit:

Original and one (1) copy to above office

One (1) copy to Regional PHD Representative

I. Statistical Summary:

A. Patient Care

1. No. of Inpatients treated: 367
2. No. of Outpatient consultations: 269 in ER 210 clinic
3. Operative Procedures Performed:

	War cas.	Other
Major	120	33
Minor	127	120

Emergency: 367

Elective: 43

4. Post-Operative Deaths:

Primary Diagnosis	Operation	Complication	Post-op. Day
Multiple C.S.M.	Exp. Lap	Hemorrhage	On Table
c/c/Ex Skull	Debridement	"	2 Days
C/S/A Skull	"	"	On Table
C/S/A Skull	"	"	1 Day
Ex Skull	None	"	1 Day

5. Anesthesia administered:

General: 65
Local: 250

B. Laboratory Services:

Urinalyses 21
Hematology 170
Blood Chemistry
Bacteriology 1
Parasitology 3
Other

C. Blood Bank:

Units drawn 60
Units dispensed 30
Units discarded 11

D. X-Ray Services

Number taken 270

II. Special Disease or Injury Problems (unusual cases, epidemics, infections, etc.):

2 Typhoid perforation

4 Corings by Water Buffalo

III. Comments (items of interest, additional activities, US/VN problems, future plans, etc.):

95% Construction Completed.

Present Navy Team due to rotate Mid February

New Navy Team due in country 1st week in February./.

(Continue on reverse side if needed)

IV. Personnel Action Needed:

Station _____ Month of Report _____

V. Logistics Action Needed:

Station _____ Month of Report _____

ENCLOSURE 4

MSTS record of port calls and record
of cargo discharged and loaded
during January 1966.

[illegible]

DESCRIPTION OF SHIPS HULLS, MACHINES, ETC.	SALE	NO.	YEAR	QTY.	UNIT	PRICE	AMOUNT	TOTAL	NO.	UNIT	PRICE	AMOUNT	TOTAL
SHIPS (HULLS)	10	01	01	15	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01
SHIPS (MACHINES)	02	02	07	03	00	03	00	03	00	03	00	03	00
SHIPS (ELECTRICAL)	21	03	05	03	00	05	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
SHIPS (ENGINE)	03	07	03	02	12	12	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
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The coastal surveillance effort continued throughout the month of February with a slight increase noted in the number of boardings and searches. MARKET TIME units observed no positive infiltration attempt. However, the circumstances surrounding a suspicious Thai junk were almost identical to the January incident of the Chinese "Nationalist" trawler.

At 0930 on 8 February USS HISSEM (DER 400) detected a sixty foot junk flying a Thailand flag at 08-15N, 104-50E, a point 17 miles from the mainland and 9½ miles from the island of Poulo Chi. Its hull was painted green; its large deckhouse was aft, and there was a single mast forward. Available cargo space was estimated at about 750 cubic feet. On each bow were painted the numerals "83294" followed by Thai writing. An eighteen foot dory was lashed athwartships aft in such a fashion that the ends of the dory overhung the sides of the trawler. Just under the dory were five 55 gallon oil drums lying on their sides, and forward by the mast two other oil drums were lashed upright on deck.

The trawler was first judged suspicious because few Thai small craft have been observed in the vicinity of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Additionally, the five gallon drums indicated that the trawler had been rigged for a longer trip than would be normal for such a vessel. When USS HISSEM approached to

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investigate no nets or fishing gear were apparent and the crew did not react with the usual interest displayed by most trawlers met at sea. For these reasons HISSPM continued to shadow the suspect trawler, which proceeded in a generally northern direction at an average speed of six knots. During the period of surveillance no attempt was made at rendezvous, nor was any fishing conducted.

COMUSMACTHAI was requested to confirm, if possible, the apparent registration number. He replied that such a registration was not used in Thailand. However, the Commanding Officer of HISSPM asserted the trawler was reminiscent of many Thai boats sighted in the vicinity of Bangkok, although it lacked the gaudy colors and ornamental scrollwork noted on most Thai craft. The facts permitted three possible conclusions: the trawler was conducting a legitimate voyage; we had intercepted a proposed, or already completed arms run into South Vietnam; or, the trawler was involved in smuggling.


HISSPM continued to shadow the trawler until 17 February, when units of Task Force 72 assumed surveillance at 22-01N, 118-34E. Five days later, on 22 February, we received the report that a Thai trawler identified as BURINCHAI, with the numbers 83294 painted on its bow, was apprehended by Marine Police in Hong Kong. At the time of apprehension the junk was carrying a large amount of opium which was impounded by authorities from the Hong Kong narcotics bureau.

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OPERATION TEE SHOT



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* * * * *

Two operations were conducted in February that employed lessons learned from the deployment of the DER/WPB/RCF team in the Gulf of Thailand in January. Operation TEE SHOT, conducted from 22 to 28 February, and Operation BROWN BEAR conducted from 27 February to 4 March, were both designed to concentrate allied forces along a small portion of the coast to prohibit attempts at infiltration or coastal movement.

Tee Shot was prompted by intelligence reports of enemy troop movements in the vicinity of the U.S. Army's Operation WHITE WING. To prevent infiltration of supplies to the beleaguered V.C. forces, while at the same time preventing waterborne escape by enemy troops, CTF 115 established a barrier patrol north of Qui Nhon. USS FALCONET was directed to patrol about twenty miles to seaward, and to assume logistic support and provide weather warnings for POINT ARDEN and PCFs 13 and 18 which patrolled close inshore in the northernmost surveillance area. USS HISSEM was directed to conduct a patrol about ten miles off the beach and provide for USS ILLUSIVE and units of Coastal Group 22, which patrolled a central sector; and USS PIEDMONT and units from Coastal Group 21 which conducted surveillance in the southern sector.

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Extremely rough sea caused the operation to be cancelled at noon on 24 February. However, additional intelligence information dictated that the operation be reactivated with an expanded surveillance area on 26 February.

The operation was considered a successful evolution of the concept of supporting small craft from a DER. Whereas one WPB and one PCF were "serviced" during the operation in the Gulf of Thailand; Tee Shot demonstrated that it was practical to support three WPBs, at a distance of over one hundred twenty miles from their permanent base of operations. Also, the tactic of vectoring the WPBs to targets detected on the DER's radar was employed with good results. The primary shortcoming witnessed during the operation was that closer liaison was needed between the Coastal Groups and the seagoing units. It was evident that the American advisor needed to be "cut-in" at the planning stage and that the cooperation of the base C.O. should be sought far enough in advance to permit coordination.

Operation Brown Bear, conducted from 0800, 27 February until 1200 on 4 March demonstrated improvements in the concept of Tee Shot. The area selected was Cape Ke Ga, the coastal terminus of the boundary of the Army's II and III Corps Tactical Zone and the border of the Vietnamese Navy's II and III Coastal Areas. As the jurisdiction of four commands abut there, the area is the responsibility of no one man and curfews and "no-fishing" regulations are not strictly enforced.

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Firefights in this area on the nights of 4 and 5 February, and the incident of an evading junk on 23 February, enforced suspicions that the V.C. were exploiting the absence of a strong authority.

To examine and patrol this area USS BRISTER (DER 327), Coast Guard Cutters PT. GRACE, PT. HUDSON, and PT. WHITE, and junks from Coastal Groups 30 and 31 executed operation Brown Bear. A pre-sail conference of all commands but the Coastal Groups was held on board BRISTER at Vung Tau at 0800 on 27 February. The units then deployed to assigned patrol areas and commenced searching. Rough seas (6 to 8 feet) curtailed the usual junk activity in the area. On the morning of 28 February, seas began to abate and junk traffic increased. BRISTER requested two PCFs to assist in boardings and searches. However, the reduced sea state proved temporary, and by noon it was evident the SWIFTS would be of little assistance to the operation, so the request was cancelled.

During the night of 28 February, while close to the beach attempting to visually locate a radar contact, PT. WHITE received machine gun fire across her bow. As the firing from the beach was of short duration PT. WHITE was unable to pinpoint its source and did not prosecute an attack. Aside from this harassment, the operation was without incident.

Although heavy weather prohibited participation by the PCFs, and on occasion limited participation by the Coastal Groups, Brown Bear was evaluated a success. Coordination

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between the WPBs and the DER proved excellent. Because the DER remained further to seaward and used longer range scales, its radar was less affected by sea return, and in several cases detected contacts which were obscured on the WPB's radar. When practicable, the WPBs were vectored to intercept these contacts. The extent and location of the patrol area was considered ideal for this type of operation and one hundred percent coverage of the no-junk forbidden zone was provided.

Many small coastal freighters and coastal junks pass in the vicinity of Point Ke Ga and Point Vinay. A DER or MSO can position its patrol off either point to cover these vessels and larger ships farther to seaward, and still provide excellent control of the WPBs, and maintain quick reaction time to lend assistance if required. In future operations, the DER or MSO could take suspect junks from the WPBs when necessary and tow them to the Coastal Group, thereby permitting uninterrupted close-in patrol by the WPB.

Attempting to profit by our experience in Tee Shot, an early request was made via Vietnamese channels for participation of units from Coastal Groups 30 and 31. Word was slow in reaching the Vietnamese C.O., and until official word was received, he maintained his regular patrol schedule. The American advisors at both bases displayed tact and diplomacy in effecting cooperation as quickly as possible. The junkmen's

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personal knowledge of the area, although delayed in forthcoming, was invaluable for positioning patrols. If at all feasible in future operations, the advisor and the Coastal Group's C.O. will attend the pre-sail briefing.

* * * * *

The PCFs produced good and bad news during the month. In the favorable ledger was the arrival of eight new boats at Danang on 13 February. These units underwent a two week training period with the six units already based at Danang. Upon completion of training, four boats, PCFs 23 through 26, were transported to Cat Lo to become the first units of PCF Division 103. This division was activated on 12 February, and personnel assigned to it were busy from that date readying the base and constructing defenses for the arrival of the boats on 20 February.

Less welcome was the news of the sinking of PCF-4 on 14 February at 10-06N, 104-52E, a position about 250 yards from the beach. In an apparent attempt to recover a V.C. flag that was attached to a bamboo pole sticking out of the water, the PCF came alongside the pole starboard side to. Prior to entering the area, PCF-4 had exploded three grenades within two feet of the pole in order to detonate any possible booby traps. It was while one of the crew members was cutting the lashings that held the flag to the pole that the mine exploded. Four crew members were killed; two were seriously injured.

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
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First assistance was rendered by VNN personnel from Coastal Group 43 who had heard the explosion. Various U.S. craft rushed to the scene to assist in recovery efforts and to provide cover fire against a V.C. force entrenched along the coast. Despite airstrikes and gunfire from U.S. units, this V.C. force directed harassing fire at recovery personnel throughout the night and most of the following day. On 15 February an LCM-8 from Rach Gia succeeded in dragging the sunken boat to a point about 2,000 yards off the beach. USS KRISHNA got underway from An Thoi and proceeded to the scene, arriving at daybreak on 16 February. KRISHNA succeeded in lifting PCF-4 off the bottom, but final recovery was not effected until 17 February. A few minor items that could be used as replacement parts were removed from the wreckage and then the hull was shipped to Subic Bay. It was examined at the Ship Repair Facility, Subic, in an attempt to improve future aluminum hull designs against minings.

Although this was a hard way to learn, it clearly demonstrated that neither our craft nor personnel were invincible. The Viet Cong's only previous attempt at a similar booby trap incident occurred the night of 28 August 1965. On that occasion a charge in an unoccupied junk was exploded when a VNN junk came alongside to investigate. Although the Viet Cong's ability to repeat a similar incident had never been doubted,

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PCF 4 AFTER MINING

SALVAGE OF PCF 4



SUPPORTING SALVAGE OF PCF 4

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accomplishment of the deed was most sobering. The principles taught at survival school became foremost in everyone's mind, and the shipboard daily routine, which had in some aspects become second nature through repetition, was critically re-examined.

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Nine WPBs, comprising Division 13 of Coast Guard Squadron One, arrived in South Vietnam on 22 February. These boats were assigned at Cat Lo. Their arrival brings the total Coast Guard forces in Market Time to twenty-six WPBs and about 430 officers and enlisted men. The new cutters will be assigned coastal patrol areas from sixty miles northeast of the mouth of the Saigon River, to one hundred and twenty miles to the southwest.

* * * * *

The penetration of Market Time waters by a Chinese Communist trawler on 1 January 1966 prompted actions that continued throughout February. Officials in Taiwan were requested to examine extant registry and reporting procedures to determine

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if any tracking system of the Chinese Nationalist trawlers could be instituted by Market Time forces. Hopefully, if TP 115 could identify and keep track of confirmed Chinese Nationalist vessels, potential infiltrators would be more easily recognized. The Navy Section of the Allied Operations Center at Taiwan began to send daily reports of those Nationalist trawlers departing Formosa bound for Vietnamese waters. Market Time units were notified of anticipated arrival of these vessels, and upon sighting a Nationalist trawler, could confirm its nationality by checking the Taiwan sailing list.

~~That~~ This system was not foolproof was amply demonstrated when six Nationalist trawlers visited Saigon during the latter half of January without Market Time personnel being aware of their impending visit. An improved tracking or identification method was sought. Through further liaison with COMUSTDC it was learned that a coded identification signal list was distributed to Nationalist fishing boats. Copies of this code list were obtained and permission was granted by the Chinese Nationalist Government to board and search any vessel showing Nationalist colors that failed to reply, or improperly replied, to a challenge.

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At present there are two permanent Market Time bases completed and operational; they are Danang and An Thoi. New bases are presently under construction at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and Cat Lo.

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Estimated completion dates of these bases is December 1966. However, as facilities become available they will be used. Completion of facilities at Qui Nhon will result in relocation of the present CSC and repair facility. The new base at Cam Ranh will replace the CSC now operating at Nha Trang. Advance Base Functional Components are expected to arrive at the three sites in the near future.

* * * * *

On 14 January COMUSMACV directed CHNAVADVGRP to develop requirements for the defense of major harbors in South Vietnam. In February, representatives from CINCPACFLT, COMINTPAC, COMIUGRU ONE and CHNAVADVGRP, visited the ports of Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau, to obtain on-scene information and study the peculiar requirements of each port. The present organization at Danang, which includes radar and visual surveillance of the harbor, a harbor entrance control post, and surveillance by small boats was considered adequate. At the other ports tentative sites were selected for harbor entrance control posts, and personnel and material requirements were drawn up for each proposed installation. It is planned that operation control of the harbor defense forces at each location will be exercised by CTF 115 in conjunction with Market Time forces in that sector. In addition to providing harbor defense for the local military base or port commander, these harbor

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defense forces can serve to extend Market Time surveillance into the internal waters of the harbor.

Mine countermeasures in the four ports ^{USC} ~~was~~ considered a contingent requirement. The fact that there has been no Viet Cong attempt to mine harbors to date does not preclude existence of the threat. However, adaptation of the techniques used in the rivers is evaluated as remote. The greater depth of water, the less restrictive pattern of ship movements in the broader expanse of water, and the relative absence of Viet Cong controlled shore areas combine to render harbors unsuited to the river technique. Introduction of visual and radar surveillance and boat patrol should effectively deny the enemy opportunity to place mines, as well as afford security to U.S. controlled shipping against attack by swimmers or small craft.

* * * * *

The "problem of the month" was in the area of communications security. In October a security group at Danang began monitoring Market Time frequencies and in January all WESTPAC security stations began an intensive survey of our airwaves. USS JAMESTOWN took station off the Vietnamese coast in February and monitored our traffic for almost the entire month. The amount of intelligence gathered, mostly pieced together from small bits of information, demonstrated inherent weaknesses in

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communications practices. As our weakest link was the uncovered voice circuits, steps were initiated to obtain KAC 140 from COMUSMACV. This publication was already used by Army field units, and distribution of it to Market Time forces would facilitate communications on joint operations. Although primarily designed for Army operations, this publication is adaptable to Navy usage.

To forestall the plain language disclosure of posits of replenishment ships operating adjacent to Market Time waters, COMSEVENTHFLT instituted a scheduling procedure that employed KAC 132 and encrypted call signs.

A concerted program was begun to require coded transmissions, enforce strict circuit discipline, and employ proper voice procedure. It is believed that success in these areas would solve half the problem.

In February, CTF 116's OPCODER was published. At the end of the month the first personnel (2 officers and 1 enlisted) arrived in-country. As future Corps Tactical Operations Center personnel, they were assigned familiarization watches, first in the CTF 115 operations center, and then at a Market Time Coastal Surveillance Center.

The month's greatest effort was directed toward the develop-

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ment of the temporary and permanent base facilities in the Delta. Requirements for all classes of items and construction were developed and submitted to COMUSMACV. Advance Base Functional Components were requested from CINCPACFLT, and appropriate bureaus are now assembling parts. At the eight permanent base sites the local officials gave their approval to the proposed U.S. acquisitions. This is the first step in a circuitous procedure of transferring property rights. Six of the eight sites require dredging, filling, and settling, prior to the commencement of construction. Expediency and the requirements of the mission dictated that we choose land that under normal conditions might be described as "not the most desirable". This is because we tried, where possible, to obtain property that was already under government control, thereby circumventing the time consuming project of title search. Also, much of the choicest riverfront property is privately owned, and quite simply, wasn't for sale. To acquire it would require a process akin to condemnation. This would be extremely time consuming and probably result in ill will in the community.

Architectural and engineering surveys of the sites are in progress, and Officer in Charge of Construction, Saigon, is scheduling a dredge at the earliest available date. The earliest date any permanent base can be operational is 1 July, and a paucity of experienced contractors in the Delta may soon make

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this target date seem like an optimist's guess.

As it is desired to employ the PERs as soon as possible after they arrive in country, austere temporary facilities are planned for Cat Lo, Nha Be, Can Tho, Vinh Long, Long Xuyen, Sadec, and My Tho. These temporary bases will be collocated with existing Vietnamese RAG bases. As the space available at some of these bases is virtually non-existent, housing facilities were sought in the neighboring towns. At Can Tho and Vinh Long, large homes have been leased. Each is planned to accommodate approximately sixty-five men. At My Tho a 100 room hotel was obtained. At the other bases where there is available space, tent cities will be set up. To provide stowage for the JP-5 necessary to operate the boats, eight 10,000 gallon fuel bladders have been obtained. These will be installed within the confines of the RAG base in order to obtain the maximum security available. Pontoons for boat moorings will be installed at the waterfront of each base. At present it appears that we can be ready with GAME WARDEN permanent facilities at Cat Lo and Nha Be; the interim facilities will be ready as planned but may not be able to support full tempo operations.

* * * * *

Progress in the advisory effort made small advances during the month. Many of the American advisors reported that they

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felt that their Vietnamese counterparts were more acceptable to recommendations and suggestions. For example, at many of the junk bases in the First Coastal Zone this attitude was demonstrated by increased work on the base defenses. Coastal Groups 11, 12 and 14 launched intensive programs to repair trenches and bunkers, string additional barbed wire, and set trip flares and Claymore mines. At Coastal Group 11 an underground ammunition storage area was repaired and a sound-powered phone circuit was installed between each outpost and the command post. Several bases conducted general drills, sometimes just once; but even one drill was more than was formerly held. An effort to have the base personnel conduct more night patrols was mildly successful at some bases. In each case the improvements can be attributed to the suggestions and proddings of the advisor.

While progress was noted in some areas, problems arose in others. Coastal Group 16 suffered from a serious shortage of personnel. Steps were initiated to have Vietnamese Navy Headquarters assign additional forces to the base, and hopefully this will be accomplished early in March. It seems that the Vietnamese Sea Force continued to inspect fewer junks than they could have. Advisory efforts to intensify the Sea Force's surveillance effort have produced no concrete results to date. Conflicting Vietnamese reports, and a suspected inefficient reporting system, only adds to the problem of keeping track of

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their true effort in conducting coastal patrol.

An unfortunate incident occurred on 19 February when the American advisor on board one Vietnamese ship discovered apparent black market dealings in American cigarettes. The advisor left the ship, and to date no replacement has been ordered aboard. While no official action has yet been taken by the Vietnamese Navy, it is reported that the cigarettes remain on board and rumors circulate that the Commanding Officer will soon be relieved of command.

* * * * *

Problems remain in the area of logistic support at An Thoi. One of the causes for the non-receipt of spare parts was discovered to be an error in administrative procedure. The requisitions sent from An Thoi to Rach Gia were being retained by the supply personnel at Rach Gia because they mistakenly thought their copies were for filing and that action copies of the requisitions had already been sent directly to Saigon. Correction of this misunderstanding, and the recent assignment of a Supply Officer to Rach Gia, will hopefully effect a smoother flow of material.

A major step to improve the supply system occurred this month when CIO, Vietnamese Navy, approved a plan that permits the Coastal Groups to keep a stock of repair parts at each base. The necessary spares have been ordered but sufficient parts have not yet arrived in-country to allow distribution to the Coastal Groups.

With success in this area, an ancillary plan that originated

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with several Coastal Group and Supply Corps advisors, was proposed to Vietnamese Navy Headquarters. This proposal recommends the establishment of marine diesel engine pools at supply centers throughout the country. When a junk engine incurs a casualty that is beyond the ability of the base personnel to repair, the inoperable engine will be "swapped" for one from the engine pool. Technically trained personnel would be assigned to the engine pool, and it is envisioned that much of the time they could accomplish the repair that could not be done at the junk base. In those cases where repair work is beyond the capability of the personnel at the engine pool, a similar "swap" will be executed with one of the two major repair facilities or with the shipyard in Saigon. The plan has many benefits, and no apparent deficiencies. The problem of a limited number of technically trained personnel would be partially overcome, and the ability to quickly replace inoperable junk engines would keep the number of junks in operational status at a high level.

* * * * *

A significant advisory project completed in February was a study undertaken to improve the utilization and scheduling of the Vietnamese and Korean Navy logistic ships. The study is mentioned here to illustrate the problems encountered, rather than to show any solutions yet accomplished.

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were necessary to accomplish a permanent improvement in the logistics system. Conclusions were that three major areas existed, namely: a permissive policy exists whereby VNN ships are assigned RAV status after almost every logistics lift; there is a lack of coordination between the various agencies that exercise control of the logistic ships and schedule which cargo is to be transported; and finally, poor scheduling only worsened the already faulty system that assembles, packs, and loads the cargo on board the ships.

To improve the situation, the first step was to make a long range schedule for the employment of logistic ships. Specific RAV periods were assigned, and a tacit agreement was reached that the schedule would be adhered to as much as possible. Positive coordination and control of the logistic ships was sought by the Vietnamese Navy. Steps were initiated to achieve efficient coordination with the Joint General Staff in order to obtain optimum scheduling, turn-around times, and standards of performance for cargo handling. Those problem areas specifically under Navy cognizance received special advisory attention, often at senior officer level. The final solution however, involves action by both Vietnamese Army and Navy officers, and this requires diplomacy and appreciation of the local inter-service modus operandi. Improvement of the system is a long term project, and concrete results will be slow in coming.

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During the last quarter of 1965 it became evident that the logistic ships were moving less cargo throughout the country than they had formerly. The precise cause for this decline was undetermined. One obvious reason was that the logistic ships were spending more time in RAV status. In January an inspection team composed of Vietnamese Navy officers and American advisors went on board an LST arriving at Saigon to investigate the extent of the necessary repairs reported by the Commanding Officer. This team made no startling discoveries. Certain repair work was necessary but much of it could be accomplished by the crew. However, the ingrained philosophy that the ship's company sails the ship and the shipyard repairs it had precluded any attempt by ship's force to undertake the necessary repairs. In this particular case the ship was not assigned RAV status. The Commanding Officer was directed to take on cargo and get underway; and if repairs were to be accomplished, they'd be done while underway or else they'd wait until the ship returned to Saigon. However, this incident treated only secondary causes, and the problem of getting more cargo transported was not going to be solved by simply ordering ships to get underway. However lax the policy may be for assigning ships RAV status, the ships are old and often are not in the best state of repair; postponing minor repairs was actually postponing a final solution.

The advisory study was undertaken to determine what steps

One LSSL was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 19 February. Delivery of this ship marks completion of a program which commenced in August 1965, wherein five LSSLs were to be delivered to South Vietnam. Four RPCs arrived in-country on 19 February and were turned over to the Vietnamese River Force. One Commandant and two Monitors which had undergone conversion in Japan arrived at Vung Tau on 21 February. These ships were retained in U.S. custody until Vietnamese crews were assigned and final acceptance procedures were effected.

On 26 February, authority was granted CHNAVADVORP to provide supplemental rations to two Vietnamese ships for a two month period. The program is an attempt to provide the crew better sustenance and at the same time permit the ships to remain on station for longer periods of time. Presently the crews are provided an "administrative allowance" of food by the Vietnamese Government. This consists of rice, salt, and selected condiments. Other foods, such as meats, vegetables, and fruits, are bought by the ship from money collected from crew members. When at sea the ship puts into port every few days to buy this produce. Rising prices, especially in cities to the north, have put many of these commodities out of the price range of the ships. Even

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the local custom of bargaining over prices worked against the ship's storekeeper when he went ashore, for the local merchant knew his "bargaining time" was limited to the few hours the ship was in port.

The obvious solution was to increase the "administrative allowance" or increase the sailor's pay. Both ideas were pursued, and both proved impractical at the present time. The suggestion was then made to provide selected canned foods on board a couple of Vietnamese ships. A similar project had been attempted with junk forces based at An Thoi, but had proved unsuccessful as the food was unpalatable to the Vietnamese. Thus the present program was limited to two ships for a short trial period.

* * * * *

During February two problems culminated for advisors at the Vietnamese Navy Shipyard. First, the in-country supply of Sao wood was exhausted and construction of sixty Yabuta junks seemed likely to be delayed. Secondly, because of the lack of wood, personnel lay-offs seemed inevitable. To keep skilled workers on the shipyard's payroll, the advisors persuaded the shipyard officers to transfer the men to other departments. Some were assigned to Eastern Repair Facility, some were sent to the Supply Center, and a few had jobs created for them.

In an effort to solve the wood shortage, one advisor was sent

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to Thailand to discover if suitable wood could be obtained there. A hard-wood of the same family was found, and arrangements were made to have it transported to Saigon. The first delivery of logs from Bangkok is expected 15 March.

* * * * *

A U.S. Navy Captain was appointed Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters on 13 February. Though such an advisory position had long been recommended, its need became increasingly apparent as mounting U.S. operational commitments drew more and more time from the working relationship between CINAVADVRIP and CNO VNN.

With a senior advisor of equal rank to the CNO VNN available to VNN staff officers, it is hoped that new avenues of communication will be opened, and closer personal contacts will be established. It seems apparent that while a letter may initiate an action, personal conversation and attention create better understanding and cooperation for all concerned. This is one benefit we hope to derive.

Another is to lend better support to our own advisors. Past experience has demonstrated that on occasion the suggestions of an advisor have fallen on deaf ears. In these cases the advisor has directed his suggestion up the American chain of command, where it was appraised at higher eschelons, and then directed down the Vietnamese chain of command. The American officer's presence at VNN Headquarters will hopefully expedite action in these cases.

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In terms of the amount of goods distributed, the Vietnamese Navy Psychological Warfare Bureau is the Navy agency doing the greatest amount of civic action. However, the reports which institute the Pay-War Bureau's projects often originate with an advisor in the field. For example, in December a letter from the advisor at Coastal Group 24 to the advisor at the Vietnamese Navy's Psychological Warfare Bureau directed attention to a refugee problem on Hon Chua Island, five miles north of Tuy Hoa. Since that date tons of food, clothing, tools, and building material have been sent to the 2,500 refugees, and the VNN Pay-War Bureau has scheduled a team of doctors, corporamen, and social workers to visit the island every two weeks. This month a mosquito elimination project was carried out, work commenced on a community toilet, and funds were procured from the USAID Province Representative for a second village wall.

A similar project was initiated by the advisor at Coastal Group 23 when he reported of refugee's problems at Song Cau. Here, 4,000 are now receiving assistance of a similar nature.

These are two examples of the large scale civic actions accomplished in February. On a lesser level, though of just as an important nature, was individual work performed by the advisor himself. At Rach Gia, a base without an assigned corporamen, the Navy advisor arranged for an Army corporamen to distribute MEDCAP material to people the advisor had seen during his patrol.

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In February, two children from Tra On District, Vinh Binh Province and one from My Tho received successful cleft lip operations. The father of the child from My Tho serves at RAS 27.

These are the illustrations of the work done during the month.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Extracts from the February Report of the Senior Medical
Officer, U.S. Naval Support Activity, Danang.

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The following is a report of medical assistance rendered to Vietnamese during February 1966.

1. One U.S. Navy doctor and three civilian doctors made weekly sick call on the eighty-three infants at Sacred Heart Orphanage in Danang Namt.
2. Another U.S. Navy doctor made rounds of the two hundred at the Danang Civilian Hospital. He performed one hip fusion at the hospital during February.
3. The Navy neurosurgeon performed eight craniotomies and one scalp skin graft at the Danang Civilian Hospital.
4. Two infants from the Sacred Heart Orphanage were admitted to Navy Hospital, Danang. One child had a severe case of pneumonia; the other suffered from congenital heart disease.
5. Six Vietnamese adults received out-patient care during the month.
6. Four Hospital Corpomen spent one week in a Vietnamese village holding sick call and treating villagers.

Civilian assistance other than medical:

1. Ten Vietnamese women are now employed at the hospital laundry, and twenty-three men are employed as laborers about the compound.
2. One U.S. Navy lieutenant conducted weekly English classes for twenty-two Vietnamese students.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

Extracts from the Report of Medical and Dental Department
Activities, III Marine Amphibious Force, February 1966.

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1. Dental: (a) Patients treated during the month: 6,672
(b) Procedures used for the month: 15,156
2. Civic Action:
 - (a) Approximately 66,378 Vietnamese civilians received 81,279 medical and dental treatments during February 1966.
 - (b) Sixteen health workers, two volunteer nurses, and four volunteer medical trainees received training during the month.
 - (c) Twenty-eight students at the Hue Medical School received training in offices of III MAF Dental Officers.
 - (d) Thirty medical students received formal training in medicine from III MAF Medical Officers.
3. USS REPOSE (AH-16) arrived at Danang on 16 February 1966 with 706 available beds.
4. RSA, Station Hospital, Danang, increased capacity to 167 beds. Construction on the hospital continues.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

**Extracts from the February Report of the Senior Chaplain,
III Marine Amphibious Force.**

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1. During February, Navy Chaplains in III MAF conducted 1,118 Divine Services with a total attendance of 25,078.
2. The chaplain strength in III MAF reached a high point of sixty-one during the month. This represents forty-one Protestant, eighteen Roman Catholic, one Eastern Orthodox, and one Jewish.
3. A training course on "Religion in Vietnam" began for the chaplains on 15 February. The chaplains in turn, will conduct two informative lectures to all III MAF units. These talks will provide an explanation on the religions in-country and discuss customs and behaviorisms, with special emphasis on "Do's" and "Don'ts" in relationships with the Vietnamese.
4. Force and Division Chaplains attended the COMUSMACV Supervisory Chaplains Conference in Saigon on 16 February. Senior Army, Air Force, and Navy Chaplains presented significant aspects of their respective programs and exchanged ideas. Final plans for a retreat center in Nha Trang which will house one hundred retreatants was presented.
5. The beginning of Lent was marked in III MAF by many Ash Wednesday Services.

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ENCLOSURE (4)

The total tonnage of material moved through Vietnamese ports by MSTB ships during the month of February declined. No problems were encountered, and the decrease is simply a reflection of the fact that less material was delivered.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96610

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FF1-1
5750/1
Ser 1/ C1911
10 AUG 1966

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Unclassified upon removal of encl (1))

From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09)

Subj: U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Historical Summary; classification of

Encl: (1) Copy of COMNAVFORV ltr FF5-16/08A:gem 5750 ser 0257 of
21 Jul 1966

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for action as appropriate. Copies of references (a), (b) and (c) of enclosure (1) have been forwarded to Chief of Naval Operations as enclosures to the CINCPACFLT Pacific Area Naval Operations Review for the corresponding months.



W.J. McNulty
W.J. McNULTY
Assistant Chief of Staff
for Administration

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21 JUL 1986

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FROM: Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, PPO San Francisco 96309
TO: Distribution

SUBJ: U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Historical Summary; classification of (U)

REF: (a) U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Historical Summary, March 1966
(b) U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Historical Summary, April 1966
(c) U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Historical Summary, May 1966

1. Paragraphs (c) through (e) contain a narrative section on the Vietnam War. Some of the items of information in this section are classified SECRET, and should be removed from the summary report if it is to be released to the public.

2. It is noted that paragraph (e) contains a list of references. (a) Paragraph (e) of the summary report - SECRET - NOT FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC.

H. C. FROEN
Chief, Secretary

1. Distribution:
2. U.S. Naval Forces, PPO, PPOV
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GROUP A
Declassified at 3-year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

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